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Evidence. Farrell v. Connetti Trailer Sales, Inc., 727 A.2d 183
(R.I. 1999). When a party in a civil action knowingly or negligently
destroys relevant evidence, the opposing party is entitled to a jury
instruction explaining that the jury may infer that had the evi-
dence been available, it would have been unfavorable to the de-
stroyer. It is an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to exclude all
evidence relating to the destroyed evidence, absent a showing that
the destruction was done in bad faith.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1989, plaintiffs William and Barbara Farrell (the Farrells)
purchased a 1989 Pace Arrow motor home from Connetti Trailer
Sales, Inc. (Connetti) for $74,164.1 Connetti is a Rhode Island re-
tailer of motor homes and trailers. 2 The Pace Arrow motor home
was manufactured by Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (Fleetwood),
whose principle office is in California. 3 Several months after
purchasing their motor home, the Farrells received a recall notice
notifying them of the need to replace the rear tag axle.4 Conse-
quently, they brought the motor home to Connetti to have the nec-
essary repairs completed. 5
Shortly after Connetti completed the repairs, the Farrells no-
ticed a squeaking noise in the rear of the vehicle and unusual vi-
brations when the motor home was in motion. 6 The Farrells
alleged that these vibrations jolted the fixtures within the motor
home out of place. 7 During a road trip, they brought the vehicle to
a shop in Las Vegas, Nevada for repairs. The Farrells alleged that
the mechanic there told them that Connetti had improperly per-
formed the recall repairs.8 While Fleetwood did eventually pay for
the repairs to the rear tag axle, it did not authorize or pay for any
repairs to the interior fixtures.9 The Farrells' problems with the
suspension and the interior fixtures continued.' 0
1. See Farrell v. Connetti Trailer Sales, Inc., 727 A.2d 183, 184 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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The Farrells eventually relocated to Florida where they con-
tinued to live in the motor home.1 Fleetwood did in fact reim-
burse the Farrells for the interior repairs, but the vehicle
continued to vibrate.' 2 After an unsuccessful attempt to have the
vehicle repaired in Florida at Fleetwood's expense, Fleetwood con-
tacted the Farrells by mail and telephone requesting that they re-
turn the vehicle for inspection or repairs.' 3 This could take place
either at Connetti or a regional service center in Paxinos, Penn-
sylvania. 14 Fleetwood offered to pick up and transport the vehicle
to Pennsylvania and back to Florida at no charge.' 5 The Farrells
refused the offer.' 6
Although the Farrells later drove the motor home through
Pennsylvania on a trip from Florida to Rhode Island, they did not
stop in Paxinos because "Mr. Farrell had never heard of Paxinos
and it would have been out of their way to get there."' 7 Mr. Farrell
refused to bring the motor home to the service center himself or
allow it to be picked up because he had already arranged to surren-
der it to the financing bank.' Eventually the Farrells decided to
allow the bank that had financed the sale to repossess the vehicle.
The bank did so, and eventually sold the vehicle "'at much less
than its value because of its condition.'"'19 This left the Farrells
with approximately $27,000 remaining on their obligation to the
bank.20
About two years later, the Farrells filed suit against Connetti
and Fleetwood. 21 The defendants filed a request for the production
of the motor home so that they could inspect it.22 The Farrells
were unable to comply with the request for production of the motor
home because by this time they had already surrendered the vehi-
cle to the bank. Both defendants filed amended answers claiming
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 184-85.
14. See id. at 185.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
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the affirmative defense of spoliation.23 The defendants then moved
in limine to exclude all evidence concerning the motor home after
Connetti last inspected it.24 The superior court granted the de-
fendants motion in limine, concluding that the evidence in ques-
tion,.the motor home, was the heart of the case. 25 The trial judge
held that it would be "patently unfair" for the Farrells to introduce
evidence about the vehicle's defects when the "defendants had no
reasonable opportunity to counteract those claims."26 The trial
justice also noted that the Farrells had refused numerous requests
by Fleetwood to inspect the vehicle during the period when it was
within the Farrells' possession.27 The defendants moved to dis-
miss. The superior court granted the motion to dismiss, holding
that "there are no set of facts admissible at trial which would give
rise to a cause of action against the defendants."28 The Farrells
appealed the entry of judgment for the defendants to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court.29
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court was faced with
the question of whether the doctrine of spoliation allows for the
suppression of all evidence that could not be examined by the op-
posing party. The trial judge excluded all evidence regarding the
condition of the motor home after Connetti last examined it.30 The
supreme court held that the trial judge appropriately applied the
factors in determining a remedy for spoliation.31 However, while
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 184.
30. See id. at 185.
31. See id. at 187. The court listed five factors:
[Un determining an appropriate sanction for the spoliation of relevant evi-
dence [the court considers] '(1) whether the defendant was prejudiced... ;
(2) whether the prejudice can be cured; (3) the practical importance of the
evidence; (4) whether the [despoiler acted] in good faith or bad faith; and
(5) the potential for abuse if the evidence is not excluded.'
Id. (quoting Northern Assurance Co. v. Ware, 145 F.R.D. 281, 282-83 (D. Me.
1993)).
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the trial judge properly concluded that action was necessary, he
abused his discretion in selecting a remedy for the spoliation.32
In making this determination the court examined its holding
in Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Eastern General
Contractors, Inc.3 3 The court noted that under the doctrine first
discussed in Eastern General, "'all things are presumed against a
despoiler.'" 34 The court explained that "the deliberate or negligent
destruction of relevant evidence by a party to litigation may give
rise to an inference that the destroyed evidence would have been
unfavorable to the spoliating party."35 The court noted that a
showing of bad faith by the despoiler is not required, but that it
can strengthen the inference that the evidence would have harmed
the despoiler. 36 The court concluded that the Farrells knew that
the motor home was relevant to their dispute with the
defendants.37
The court noted that while Eastern General was instructive on
the doctrine of spoliation, it did not address the precise situation
presented by the Farrells' case.38 Here, the trial judge did more
than instruct the jury to draw a negative inference from the un-
availability of the motor home.39 He barred the plaintiffs from in-
troducing any evidence of the motor home's condition after
Connetti had repaired it.40 Noting that although courts in other
jurisdictions have held that a trial judge may bar all evidence re-
lating to evidence destroyed by that party, the supreme court held
that that doing so in this case was an abuse of discretion.41
The court held that the exclusion of all post-repair evidence
was unwarranted absent a showing of bad faith on the Farrells'
part.42 Concluding that bad faith on behalf of the Farrells had not
been shown, the court determined that the Farrells reluctance to
bring the motor home to Connetti was not "arbitrary and unrea-
32. See id.
33. 674 A.2d 1227 (R.I. 1996).
34. Farrell, 727 A.2d at 186 (quoting Eastern General, 674 A.2d at 1234).
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 187.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
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sonable."43 This finding was based upon the history of problems
with the repair work that Connetti did and the fact that the Far-
rells would have lost possession of the motor home for an unknown
amount of time.4 The court also noted that while the defendants
knew of the Farrells' intention to surrender the vehicle to the
bank, they never offered to inspect the vehicle while it remained in
either the bank's or the Farrells' possession.45
Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case for a new
trial, instructing the superior court to allow the Farrells the oppor-
tunity to admit evidence of the defective repairs and to allow the
defendants the opportunity to rebut this evidence. 46 The court also
ordered the trial judge to instruct the jury that because of the Far-
rells' conduct in causing the motor home to be unavailable, they
may infer that had the inspection been performed, it would have
shown that the repairs were done properly.47
CONCLUSION
Where a party deliberately or negligently destroys relevant ev-
idence, the opposing party is entitled to a jury instruction explain-
ing that the jury may infer that had the evidence been available, it
would have been unfavorable to the case of the party that de-
stroyed it. The jury must also be instructed that the inference is
permissible, but not mandatory. In addition, a trial judge may not
exclude evidence relating to the destroyed evidence absent a show-
ing of bad faith by the spoliating party.
Gregory B. Blasbalg
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 188.
47. See id.
